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H – 689

International Court of Justice

H0689 - 0002

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

H0689 - 0003

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certife qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministére Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1945.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Walter Siemers

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

H0689-0004

Rejected

Raeder No. 36

Defence Exhibit No. .....

Statement of Attorney at Law Dr.Siemers

I hereby certify that the following document :

"Memorandum of the French Premier Daladier"

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 6,Berlin 1941:

"The secret documents of the

French General Staff"

from page 45, document No.19 has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 6 March 1946.

(Dr.W.Siemers)

H0689 - 0005

Note of the French Premier Daladier

(Handwritten remark):

Copy of a handwritten note
of the President Daladier 19 January 1940

General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan should be asked to draft a memorandum regarding the possible intervention for the destruction of Russian oil fields.

Case 1: Cutting of the oil transports in the Black Sea destined for Germany. It concerns above all German ships. In this case Russia will not be thrown into the war.

Case 2: Direct intervention in the Causasus.

Case 3: Without making a direct move against Russia, measures should be taken to promote the tendencies of self-determination of the Mohammedan groups of population in the Caucasus.

(handwritten)

1 copy to General Koeltz

1 copy to General Vuillemin.

Photo copy page 207.

H0689 - 0006

Rejected

Raeder No. 37

Defense Exhibit No.....

Certificate of Attorney at Law Dr.Siemers:

I hereby certify that the following document:

"Memorandum of the Supreme Commander of the French Army, General Gamelin"

from the

White Paper of the Foreign Office No. 6,Berlin 1941:
"The secret documents of the French General Staff"

from page 50-52, document No.22 was copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

(Dr.W.Siemers)

H0689-0007

Memorandum of the Supreme Commander of the French Army, General Gamelin

Extract *)

Secret

22 February 1940

Memo

(Handwritten marginal remark:) This memo, with very small changes was sent to Premier Reynaud on the 4th of April 1940, together with letter No. 359 Cab./DN (Through Mr. Baudouin)

about an action which has the purpose to shut off the Caucasia oil wells to Germany and USSR. An action by the Allies against the Russian oil territory of the Caucasus may have the purpose: Either to take away the oil from Germany which she is now receiving from this territory - or to take away from Russia raw material which is indispensable for her economy and in this way to weaken the power of the Soviet Union. At the same time Germany would be hit by cutting off her supply of Russian fuel.

In order to bring this about, three actions may be considered:

-attacks upon oil transports to Germany through the Black Sea, attacks upon the main centers of the Caucasian oil industry.

-incitement of an insurrection among the Mohammedan population of the Caucasus.

.....

Footnotes:
*) Of this extensive memo only pages 1,5,6,7 which refer to the Baku action, as well as page 12 (conclusions) have been reproduced .
**) not on hand.

H0689 - 0008

II. Military actions against the Caucasian oil industry.
A military action against the Caucasian oil resources must have the purpose to hit the vulnerable parts of the oil industry.

To this belong the production centers, the storage and the loading facilities. Principally, there are three:

Baku

Grozny-Maikop

Batum

Grozny is situated on the northern slope of the Caucasian steppe and is too far to offer an opportunity for military action, even from the air. There remains only Baku and Batum.

The Baku action.

1. Description of the operation.

Baku is 500 kilometers from the Turkish border; in between lies the vast stretches of the Armenian high plateau, which is a poor and mountainous land without communications, so that a land attack, with Turkey as a starting point is out of question.

A land action can only be considered from the northwest corner of Iran. This on the one hand presupposes the consent of Iran, on the other hand it would mean the transport of extensive allied troop units, since the forces which Iran has at her disposal in this territory are completely insufficient to carry out the intended operation.

H0689 - 0009

In view of difficulties of every kind which an operation on land entails, we have to consider an attack upon Baku from the air.

Since Baku is at the same time production center, storage place and shipping port, an attack from the air upon this city would aim at the destruction or setting on fire of the following installations:

The refineries; they are easy to hit, are vulnerable and their reconstruction is very costly and takes much time;

The oil storage tanks; they are also easy to hit and vulnerable;
the port facilities;
the railroad line Baku-Rostow.

2. Significance of the operation:

Baku is by far the most important oil center of the Caucasus.

75 % of the Russian oil production emanates from the drilled wells of Baku; the refineries of Baku are the largest of the Caucasus.

Per railroad and per ship (Caspian Sea)more than 50% of the Russian oil production of the Caucasus is exported via Baku.

An air attack upon Baku, if carried out with a sufficient member of planes, and if repeated so that the resulting destructions,remain permanent, would be especially remunerative.

H0689 – 0010

Such a attack would not only hit Germany, but would deny the USSR a considerable part of the Caucasian oil, and since Moscow needs for its motorized troops and its agricultural enterprises nearly all of its oil production, the Soviets would get into a difficult situation.

3. Manner of execution.

The bases for an air attack upon Baku must be:

Either in Turkey: territory of Diarbekirerzerum; or in Iran; or in Syria and in Irak (Djezirch and Mosul territory)

(Handwritten marginal remarck) At the moment the preparations are concentrated upon Syria.

In both cases it would be essential to reach an agreement with Turkey or Iran, beforehand be it for the purpose of constructing bases or for the purpose of flying over Turkish or Iranian territory.

(Handwritten marginal remark) Is not true anymore. Soon we have more planes ready than the English.

On account of the distance to be surmounted (from Taebris to Baku 400 kilometers, from Erzerum or Mosul to Baku 700 kilometers), it would be necessary to use for the bombarding of Baku 6-8 groups of modern bombers which have a large loading capacity and a wide radius of action.

On account of our lacking of planes of this category, as the situation is at present, it would be necessary that the largest part of the necessary planes would be furnished by the English.

.....

H0689-0011

Conclusions

1. Cutting off the oil sent from the Caucasus to Germany on the Black Sea is only of limited interest because of the limited significance the Russian shipments coming this way have for the oil supply of the Third Reich.

(Handwritten marginal remark) We now think of a combined operation of the air force and fleet. But the value of such an operation remains.

2. An action against the Russian oil industry in the Caucasus, is, on the other hand of very great interest for the Allies. It would facilitate a very heavy if not decisive blow against the military and economic organisation of Soviet Russia. In a few months USSR could get into such difficulties that she might reach the danger of a complete collapse.

If this should be achieved, the blockade against Germany would be closed in the east by blocking the supplies from Russia, and she would be forced to live from the imports from the northern countries and the Balkan, which are the last economic resorts where she could still defend herself.

3. An action against the oil fields of the Caucasus could take place in the shape of a political action, which endeavors to bring about an insurrection of the Mohammedan population of the Caucasus, or in the shape of a military operation against the important centers of the Russian oil industry.

.....

Facsimilie page 213

H0689 - 0012

Rejected

Raeder No 38

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Attorney at law, Dr. Siemers:

I herewith certify that the following document:

Notes of the Commander in Chief of the French army, General Gamelin, on French-British military policy in the Balkans and the Middle-East

has been correctly copied from page 185, Document No 131 of the "White book" of the Foreign Office No 7, Berlin

Documents, concerning the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece.

Nuernberg, 6 April 1946

Dr. W. Siemers.

H0689 – 0013

Notes of the Commander in Chief of the French forces, General Gamelin, on French-British military policy in the Balkans and the Middle-East.

(Extract)

Secret 6 March 1940

. . . 3. The Balkan Problem is chiefly the concern of France, since she considers it desirable and possible to:

a) close the straits of the Aegean Sea for Germany and the Soviet-Union;

b) to oppose the German and Sovietrussian armies in the interior of the Balkans by the Balkan armies on a huge front of attrition .

This question strictly depends upon the attitude of Italy, without whose open or tacit consent we cannot deploy forces in Saloniki.

Moreover, the French army always maintained regular relations with the Jugoslav, the Rumanian and also the Greek army.

Under these circumstances the French High Command expects to deploy the greater part of the French forces in the Saloniki Sector, be it, in favour of the allies, to close the Aegean Sea to their opponents or be it to assist Jugoslavia and Rumania or to solve the Bulgarian problem in conjunction with the rest of the Balkan states.

s. Gamelin

Facsimile of page 186

H0689 - 0014

Rejected

Raeder No 39

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney at law:

I herewith certify that the following document:

"The Commander in Chief of the French forces, General Ganelin to the French Minister President, War Minister and Minister of National Defense, Daladier"

has been correctly copied from pages 59, 60 and 61 of document No 25

from the

White book of the Foreign Office No 6, Berlin 1941

"Secret Files of the

French General Staff".

Nuernberg, 13 March 1946

s.

Dr. W. Siemers

H0689 - 0015

The Commander in Chief of the French forces to the French Minister President, War Minister and Minister of National Defense of the Country, Daladi

T o p s e c r e t
No 314 - Cab/D.N.
concerns: Operations in the Middle-East

Headquarters, 12 March 1940

I have the honor, to forward to you copies of the following items:

a) letter No 295/3 S of General Weygand to General Gamelin of 7 March 1940
b) telegram answer to General Weygand of 10 March (309 Cab. D.N.)
c) telegram 1236 of General Weygand in connection with 295 of 7 March .

I add the draught of an answer, which I intend to forward to General Weygand by telegram, as soon as you give you consent.

Marginal Note: Consent of Minister President by letter 645 D.N. of 14 March 1940.

Handwritten post script of the General:

I, personally am of the opinion that it is in our interest, to pursue the question of attack of Baku and Batum (especially with the air force). The operations to be carried out in connection with this would serve well to supplement the Scandinavian operations. Should the latter operations meet with obstacles, then there is all the more reason for continuing action in Trans-Caucasia.

s. Gamelin.

H0689 – 0016

Middle-East High Command

The General

No 295/3.S.
T o p S e c r e t
Copy

Command post 601,
7 March 1940

General Weygand to the Commander in Chief of the army and Chief of Staff of the National Defense.

Air marshal Mitchell, Commander of the air-force of the Middle-East, who, accompanied by General Jauneaud has arrived at Beyrut today on his trip to Ankara, reported to me, that he had received directives from London concerning preparations for a possible bombardment of Baku and Batum. He disclosed his intention to me, to request Marshal Tchakmak's permission to reconnoitre for airfields in the region of Diarbeki Erzerum, Kars and of Yan-Sees, which would serve as stop-overs for planes, whose main bases are located at Djezireh.

Air-Marshal Mitchell has requested my permission to reconnoitre our airfields in Djezireh since the political situation in Irak, whose independence is acknowledged, doe not permit usage of airfields in this sovereign territory without danger of complications. I beg to inform you, that I have granted the Air-Marshal's request. The inspection will be carried out by British and French officers, who will appear in civilian clothes .

H0689 – 0017

Thus, the impression will be created that the inspection took place for the purpose of exploitation of oil-wells of this territory.

s. Weygand.

Secret
Copy
No 309 - Cab/D.N.

10 March 1940

General Gamelin to General Weygand.
Answer to your letter 295/3.S. of 7 March.

I fully agree with your consent given to Air-Marshal Mitchell with respect to carrying out reconaissance to obtain ground for airfields in Djezireh

General Gamelin

S e c r e t
Copy
No 1. 236

Beyrut, 10 March 1940
16.23 hours

General Weygand to General Gamelin

In the course of my letter No 295/3-S of 7 March, concernin British intentions in Baku, I beg to report to you that General Wavell informs me of receiving a letter with

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instructions from the British War Ministry, to examine the prerequisites of possible action in the Caucasus in case of hostilities from Russia.

The War-office points out, that this possible operation would be the responsibility of the army.

General Wavell with respect to this counts upon contacting Marshal Tchakmak. In order to maintain secrecy greatest caution will be exercised.

I reply to him, that in this respect I have received no instructions from you.

I request that they be forwarded speedily.

s. Weygand.

General Gamelin to General Weygand

S e c r e t 12 March 1940
Copy D r a f t
No Cab./D.N.

Answer to telegram 1.236
The note of 7 March enclosed in my letter 293-Cab./D.N. , acquaints you with the over all concepts, which, with respect to operations in the Middle-East and especially with respect to possible operations in the Caucasus, I have proposed to the Minister-President. I confirm to you, that, in my opinion, operations in the Middle-East would have to be carried out by the British High-Command whereas operations in the Caucasus are the responsibility

---

not on record.

H0689 – 0019

of the Turkish Command, since the latter are carried out chiefly by Turkish forces with the aid of the Air force and support of probably a few Allied special units.

You can contact Marshal Tchakmak on all pertinent questions and participate in all preparatory investigation of the Middle-East.

I will forward to you by courier a condensed treatise on operations in the Caucasus.

s. General Gamelin

Facsimile of page 229

H0689 - 0020

Filed 11 May 47

Raeder No. 41

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney at law:

I herewith certify, that the following document:

Notes of General Gamelin, Commander in
Chief of the French Army

taken from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 6, Berlin 1941:
"The Secret Files
of the French General Staff"

pages 63-65, document No. 27, have been copied correctly.

Nuremberg, 16 March 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689 – 0021

Notes of the Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin.

Top S e c r e t 16 March 1940

No. 325 Cab./D.N.

N o t e

on the conduct of war.

(Final draft taking into consideration the remarks of the commanders in chief and of General Buhrer).

Since the conceptions laid down in the "War-Plan for 1940" (1)* form the basis of our proceedings it is recommended, in view of the signing of the Russian-Finnish armistice, to determine what operations could be undertaken on short sight to deal some perceivable, if not decisive blows against Germany. With the deadlocked fronts it is at the moment very difficult, to obtain considerable results on land. Therefore Germany must be forced, to give up her present attitude of biding her time. The first step necessary is a tightening of the blockade. Besides the economical results which are to be expected, the following aims should be aspired to:

I. It may be in Germany's interest, to be considerate to Holland and Belgium, since these enable her to circumvent to a large extent the effects of the blockade. It is therefore obvious, that a strict control of imports to Holland and Belgium might be the suitable means to bring Germany to the point, where she will cut things short

(1) Communication No. 260 Cab./D.N. of 20 Feb. 1940 sent to the Prime-Minister.

* Is not on hand.

H0689 - 0022

and will invade the Netherlands and Belgium since they would then be of very little economic value.

II. With the Scandinavian Countries conditions are different. Belgium and Holland are serving Germany mainly as middleman with the outside, whereas Sweden supplies Germany with an indispensible raw-material, namely iron.

Our aim must be to forbid this supply.

A simple way would be to declare, that the supply of certain vital products such as iron, to the Reich by neutral countries bordering on the Reich, was considered as giving assistance in a real way and would result in reprisals. Thus Sweden could only deliver ore to Germany under the threat of a blockade; the same risk would apply to Norway for transit.

In case the two countries yield, our aim will be accomplished; otherwise their sea-trade should be blocked.

Under such circumstances Germany might possibly decide, to react and to intervene in Sweden with arms.

She would then have to find us ready for defence; to this end a first echelon of military forces must be ready in England and France for transport to Scandinavia, be it for a counter-stroke or for preventive measures.

H0689 - 0023

III. The cutting off of the German import of Russian oil (1) from the Caucasus first brings up the question of opening hostilities against the Soviet-Union.

Moreover the problem of participation or at least consent of Turky arises.

As with everything that takes place in the Orient, the attitude of Italy cannot be overlooked.

Be that as it may, the bombardment of Petroleum-installations at Baku and Batum from the air could considerably hamper Germany's supply of motor fuel.

According to present day information it would require 9 groups (Fliegergruppen) to do this. The command of the French air-force intends to supply 4 groups, the remainder would have to be supplied by the Royal Air Force.

These groups, whose base would be Djezireh, where the terrain is ready or under preparation (in the northern part of the French Levante) would have to have bases also in Asiatic Turkey,(2) if possible.

---

(1) The stopping of Rumanian oil deliveries to Germany can at present not be effected either by blockade or by military operations.

(2) Investigations about territory are under way at present.

H0689 - 0024

After being informed fourteen days to a month in advance, the command of the French Air-Force could at any time undertake this bombardment in Trans-Caucasia, and this with two groups of heavy bombers, which would be re-enforced by two groups of medium bombers; they should be drawn from the mother-country, if the situation on the French front permits it.

The operations in the air could be effectively supported in the following manner:

1) By actions of the fleet, whose aim would be to paralyze the traffic in the Black Sea. This would be basically entrusted to the French-British U-boats. Their passage through the straits would be on the presumption of Turkey's expressed or silent consent, and they would also need a base on the shores of the Black Sea in Asia-Minor.

2) By actions on land, which could only be carried out by Turkey, but she could have the assistance of certain parts of our Levante-troops. Upon Great Britain's instigation Iran could also participate in this operation.

IV. With due consideration of all the misgivings expressed against it during the last session of the war-committee, the thought persists, that a start should be made as soon as possible with the laying of floating mines in rivers and the throwing of mines through the air force.

In this way a partial paralysis of Germany's inland- navigation system could be effected.

It is important that the air-force should as soon as possible drop the

H0689 – 0025

objections which she at present raises against this operation.
All in all the Russian-Finnish armistice does not necessitate any substantial changes in our goals we had set for 1940; but it must induce us to act more quickly and energetically.
By combining blockade-measures with certain military operations we would be able not only to increase the economic limitations but also cause Germany to change her military watchfully waiting attitude.
The experience of six months of war makes it evident, that the neutrals are afraid of Germany. Not approaching them with the same threats, we yet must let them feel our power.
It is to be understood that the diplomatic and military proceedings must be carried on in the same energetic tone.

Gamelin

Facsimile page 238.

Filed May 17, 1946

Raeder No 46

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney at Law:

I herewith certify that the following

Memorial-Day address 1939 of

Dr. h. c. R a e d e r , then General-

admiral,

from the "Archiv" No 60 of March 1939, Berlin,

Pages 1841 - 1846 has been correctly copied.

Nuremberg, 22 April 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689 - 0026

H0689 - 0027

12 March 1939

Memorial Day and Day of Military Sovereignty.

This year for the first time in all localities of Greater-Germany and in the German colonies abroad Memorial Day is celebrated also as day of military sovereignty. The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces had delegations of officers place a wreath on the sarcophagus of Field-Marshal v. Hindenburg at the Reich-memorial Tannenberg, on the tomb of Infantry-General L u d e n d o r f f at Tutzing and on the tomb Field-Marshal Conrad v. H o e t z e n d o r f at the Hietzinger cemetery in Vienna. The celebrations which in the garrisons were conducted by the armed forces and in all other places by the Party, centered around the traditional state ceremony taking place at the State-Opera Unter den Linden in Berlin, where, in the presence of the Fuehrer, Generaladmiral Dr. h. c. R a e d e r delivered the memorial-address; following this the Fuehrer placed a wreath in the memorial Unter den Linden and took the salute of the Battalion of Honor formed by the three sections of the Armed Forces.

In connection with the State-Ceremony Generaladmiral R a e d e r delivered the following address:

"My Fuehrer! Comrades! German men and women!

On Memorial-Day four years ago at noon, when everywhere the

H0689-0028

flags of the third Reich were hoisted, it was a sign of thrilling joy, which inspired the whole nation. One of the fundamentals of the honor of German men, a symbol of freedom and of sovereignty had been restored to the nation by the Fuehrer: Military sovereignty! Thus every man, able to bear arms and deserving the honor was from now on sure of the right to protect his homeland by bearing arms. One of the most unbearable shackles of the dictates of Versailles had been broken, the way for the development of the strength of our people, so long held down, had been re-opened, and the hope for greater happiness due to a secure future, had come in. A new era of German history had begun.

Today, four years later, we look back over a road whose milestones are indeed unique witnesses in the history of the Reich. That, which was only a hope or faint desire in the hearts of individuals then, best had through centuries been the dream and longing of so many Germans, has become a reality: Greater Germany. In a seemingly miraculous development for an outside observer, but one for which in reality we have fought with an unshakable strength of faith and with unsurpassed determination, sure of victory, the Fuehrer has opened the way to the homeland for the brothers and sisters in the "Ostmark" and in "Sudetenland", convinced of his good right and supported by the weapons which since that day he had again placed in the hands of the Armed Forces. Thus it is very significant that it is not mourning for what had once been lost, but the pride of what we have gained eternally that forms the outward frame for this day.

H0689 - 0029

The flags flying at the top of the masts today are for us a sign, that the testament of our dead has been fulfilled. They, who gave their lives believing in Germany's grandeur, whether jubilantly and full of the enthusiasm of the year 1914 or with the hard and bitter determination of the year 1918, they would not be able to understand if we, after bearing their testament in loyal hands through long, dark years, should today, when it is fulfilled, give way to mourning only.

In our dead we see that sustaining spiritual power, which, effective even beyond the grave, caused the first defiant faith in a new future to take root in the nation, a reflection of the front-soldier of the last year of the war and hence an example of the fighter's courage and staking of the very last. It was this strength that sustained the men who were called to shape a new German Reich out of the experience of their comradeship at the front, and to weld it together unbreakably in the new national community of Greater-Germany. It brought the victory, beyond all the disgrace and suffering of the post-war period. A shining victory! We give expression to this victory by combining with the memorial to our dead the thought of our new and glorious armed force. But thereby we do not forget our fathers and brothers who sacrificed their lives. Because our Greater-Germany has been founded upon their sacrifice, we remember them with undying gratitude. No matter where the German soldier stood and fought, on land or sea in the air above all

(Page 108
of orig.)

Filed May 18, 1946

RAEDER No. 19

Defense Exhibit No. .....

H0689 - 0030

Statement by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the extract below has been copied correctly from

BIENNIAL REPORT of the
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
July 1, 1943, to June, 1945
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR
pages 1 - 2

Nuernberg, 15 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0689 - 0031

Biennial Report of

THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

JULY 1, 1943, to JUNE 30, 1945

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Introduction

Dear Mr. Secretary:

For the first time since assuming this office six years ago, it is possible for me to report that the security of the United States of America is entirely in our own hands.

H0689 – 0032

(Page 116, lines 21 to 30 incl.)

In order to establish for the historical record where and how Germany and Japan failed I asked General EISENHOWER to have his intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking members of the German High Command who are now our prisoners of war. The results of these interviews are of remarkable interest. They give a picture of dissension among the enemy nations and lack of long-range planning that may well have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its most critical moments.

H0689 - 0033

(Page --, lines 11 - 28)

No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan. Although the High Command approved HITLER's policies in principle, his impetuous strategy outran German military capabilities and ultimately led to Germany's defeat. The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of personalities in which military judgement was increasingly subordinated to HITLER's personal dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of BLOMBERG, von FRITSCH, and BECK and of the last effective conservative influence on German foreign policy.

The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low Countries developed serious diversions between HITLER and the General Staff as to the details of execution of strategic plans. In each case the General Staff favored the orthodox offensive, HITLER an unorthodox attack with objectives deep in enemy territory. In each case HITLER's views prevailed and the astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised

H0689-0034

(Page lines 1 - 7 incl.)

HITLER's military prestige to the point where his opinions were no longer challenged. His military self-confidence became unassailable after the victory in France, and he began to disparage substantially the ideas of his generals even in the presence of junior officers. Thus no General Staff objection was expressed when HITLER made the fatal decision to invade Soviet Russia.

(Lines 21 - 28 incl.)

Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.

In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan.

14 May 1946

Certified true copy

Martin L. LOWENTHAL

Civ. D 150 848.

H0689 – 0035

the fronts, always he was facing a superior force. Of him superior performance was always demanded, the privations and hardships which he had to undergo reached a superhuman measure. He bore this burden, unshakably believing in himself and the grandeur of Germany and convinced of his responsibility to his homeland, whose shelter and protector he considered himself. He bled, he died. And yet he has conquered!

When the German Armed Force and with it the entire German nation honors its victorious leaders of the war, and when especially on this day the names of the late Generalfeldmarshal von H i n d e n b u r g , General L u d e n d o r f f and Conrad v. H o e t z e n d o r f or of the Admirals S c h e e r and Count S p e e and of the greatest of all flying leaders, Rittmeister von R i c h t h o f e n are in honorable mention on the lips of all men, they have already become a symbol for us. With them enshrined lies the thought of the millions of dead unknown and un-named, which were demanded of us by the great war in order that the people might live and the Reich might endure. To these names we now add one of a man who still lived to see the home-coming of the "Ostmark" but could not witness how the Fuehrer won liberty for his Sudeten-German homeland, the name of General K r a u s s. In him has passed a genuine German and a great army-leader, whose life, intentions and thoughts were centered upon the great Reich of the Germans.

The memory of our dead is joined by sympathy with the grief of those left behind and the orphans and the fate

H0689 - 0036

of the w a r - i n v a l i d s ever reminding us of that great time and whose lot to ease is simply the duty of gratitude. This duty is fulfilled in an exemplary manner by the "Kriegsopferversorgung" (care for war-victims), whereas the National Society for the Care of German War Graves has for twenty years now helped to nobly express the thanks of the German people to their dead heroes by developing and caring for the war-graves in an appropriate manner.

Beyond the borders of our Reich our memory goes also to the soldier-dead of the nations who in loyal comradeship of arms fought on our side. In their ranks we count today also a great man of his country, K e m a l A t a t u e r k . In his personality we find combined the great General and valiant companion at arms with the heroic leader of the people and genial creator of the State. His proud leadership is an ideal. His name is history. If we are filled with gratitude towards our former allies, we also do not want to forget the courage and bravery of those men who were gallant opponents and sealed the fulfillment of their soldierly duties towards their country with their death.

H0689-0037

Kapitel [illegible].

Soldiers of almost all the nations of earth have fought and shed their blood on the battle-fields of the world-war. Millions are covered by the green turf or the deep sea. When we today in serious retrospection and with a calm outlook ask ourselves the question, whether this tremendous investment of blood and property has laid the fruits of a famous victory and a pleasant peace into the lap of any of these nations, we must answer negatively. The bloodiest of all the dictates of peace has left incurable wounds behind and has therewith succeeded only in creating unrest.

The wrong committed and the blind hatred had of necessity one day to produce reactionary forces, for never in history have one-sided humiliation and suppression become a permanent basis for a peacable getting along of the nations. And this counter-pressure will exert itself until that wrong has been completely made right.

Such a people as the Germansare, who during the war already had to take the road of hunger and privations, who experienced through one and a half decades of post-war impotence, how even the semblance of right, granted to it by that dictated peace, was trodden under foot by hatred and disregard, could only take one road if it did not consciously want to become the puppet of the victorious powers eventually and thus degenerate and be lost forever in the most terrible misery: the road to freedom. The great Fuehrer was given to the German people. Through him it took this way, after the pre-requisites for this gigantic struggle had been created. The German people has made National-Socialism, born of the spirit of the German front-soldier, its ideology and is following the symbols of its re-birth with a love as fervent as its passion is fanatical. It has experienced National-Socialism and not suffered it, as so many helpless critics outside are believing.

H0689 – 0038

The Führer demonstrated to his people that the largest, inexhaustible source of strength lies in the community of people (Volksgemeinschaft) whose dynamics not only secure inner peace but make possible the release of all creative national forces. He has returned selfconfidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people and thereby enabled them to retake, out of their own strength their divine right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach with courage the tremdenou present problems and to work on their solution. Thus the Germ people and the Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and of the world than some of our neigbours are able to recognize today. This is the reason for the clear and unsparing announcement of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry whose doings destructive to the nations we have felt sufficiently on our own national body...This is the reason for the union with all like-minded nations which are, not willing as Germany is not, to have their strength, dedicated to reconstruction and internal peace work, disintegrated by foreign ideologies and parasites foreign to the race. And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other peoples which alone can guarantee peaceful living together of the nations with each other in this world.

Within the framework of the German community of people, the Führer has assigned our task to us soldiers as protectors of our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction, as educators of the young men fit for military service who pass through our hands as one body.

H0689-0039

Besides of this educational work in the military sense this task also demands the further education of the young soldier in the spirit of the National Socialist ideology and form of life. This part of the task which has become to us an imperative demand as much as a duty of honour we shall and must fulfil only shoulder to shoulder and in upright comradeship with the Party and its organisations whose will and whose effort as ours, serves only one goal, the forming of the German within a never failing community of fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft). Thus Wehrmacht and Party, in attitude and spirit, have more and more become one indivisible entity. Were it not one of the fundamental slogans of the military and National Socialist world of ideas, we should to-day be forced to see the necessity of an ever closer union more than ever if we look beyond our borders. There was a time when the Führer presented to the world his proposals for an effective and sensible limitation of armaments. They were rejected without exception. The outlaw was to remain outlawed, the powerless to remain weak. Might was put before right and we were supposed to regard this dictate of hatred as sacred. But hypocrisy can never be sacred and wrong never be right. It cannot pass before history. Therefore it had to break up. And it did so against the right to life of a nation of 80 million. For this two million soldiers gave their lives in the world war. This nation needed a new,

H0689 - 0040

a true peace, the peace of justice and honour, the peace with out hatred. The world also needs such a peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain such a peace a strong one won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German Wehrmacht to secure this peace of the German nation against everybody.

But there is no lack of signs that mischievous hands are working in order to undermine the new peace with all means. The world has started on armaments the gigantic extent of which in unison with irresponsible war propaganda are well suited to seriously endanger the peace won laboriously.

We do not want to dispute anybody's right to do what appears to him to be necessary for his safety. That we do ourselves! But we cannot silently and inactively look on when Germany is selected without any cause to be presented to the entire world as the sole reason for the tremendous armament measures particularly if it is always said that Germany alone has the intention to attack her neighbours. We know that the element responsible for such statements will not be found where they are trying to drive their peoples on the battle field.

But the soldier over there whom we respect as the chivalrous representative of his country may accept a soldier's word: What Germany needs and wants is peace !

These are not mere words but this has been proven by concrete examples. Germany's reconstruction requires full years of quiet development. Through her Führer Germany has offered her hand many a time and her peace proposals were rejected just as many times. When hope for real satisfaction and pacification arose during the past year it had to recognize that the armament tempo of the others only increas

H0689 - 0041

Therefore Germany must think first of all of her own security. According to the will of the Fuehrer the German Armed Forces will be further strengthened and enabled to fulfil their permanently getting more responsible tasks whatever the military condition of the others may be. Where we here attained an advantage, it will be held. Where a gap shows, it will be closed. Where additional armament is necessary, it will be begun. And don't let anybody believe that our arms were blunt if German soil should be spoiled or German blood shed. Germany is the protector of all Germans, on this side and beyond the border. That has been proved by the shots of Almeria. That we can say this to-day, fully conscious of our strength, is the work and the exclusive merit of a single man, whose genial leadership, carried by an unflinching belief in his people and an immense will power, has led a whole nation in a few years out of the darkest night into a bright presence, who to-day as the creator of a Greater Germany proceeds us imperturbably on his road into the future. His example gave new hope, new courage and his own belief to all the Germans. The thanks which the Armed forces are expressing to their leader and Commander in Chief may be the solemn promise of unchangeable allegiance in obedience and performance of duty.

H0689 – 0042

Ttue to his example, we will never leave yhe road shown to us and we will give as one man everything for nation and Reich. It was the Fuehrer who led his loyal followers from victory to victory. His faith lent wings to our Strenght. His will created a new idealism of action to which his comrades in arms remained faithful to the death. Many a one died but he died like the fighters of the great war for a free Germany on ce did. All of them imbued a young generation with the great tradition of the death for a sacred cause in the firm knowledge that their blood will one day prepare the way into th e dream of liberty.

therefore let us include in our memory thr millions of dead of the world war and also those men who died for their free and greater homeland in the national socialist party, in the free corps, in the East mark and in the Sudetenland. And with them we salute the bravr men who voluntarly j oined the columns of the Spanish fighters for freedom to risk their life for a great idea, the fight against the world bolshevism. they, who fell there on foreign soil, knew, that their blood was shed in a higher sense for their homeland also, as a symbol for that powerful current which, for all times unites everything German in the world with blood and good . We a lso remember the dead of the young Wehrmacht who in devoted service, filled by their mission as the soldiers of the nation, found a soldiers death. they are the taken of the most faithful performance of duty in the spirit of our great military past

H0689-0043

They all gave the highest and the last, their lives. And they did nothing but their duty, although it was the highest duty which can be imposed on any man.

But in this performance of duty there is a serious reminder and challenge. It is: Prove yourself worthy of the dead. Take their sacrifice in the times gone by as an example for your sacrifices of to-day. That is how Adolf Hitler's Germany has understood the call. In our community the spirit of the voluntary sacrifice of one for all is alive as the greatest treasure. Every year, on Memorial Day this idea shall echo in the people as a new solemn promise, so that it can work eternally, never weakening in its strength. We believe that we can best fulfil the legacy in our inner most of our dead the outer fulfilment of which we celebrate to-day with a thankful and moved heart if we, mindful of their sacrifices, always keep our own duties before our eyes. Their law should also be ours, the love for the Fatherland and the Devotion to the Fuehrer and to our eternal nation. This we will promise by God the Allmighty and this solemn promise be our respectful salute to our dead ones, before whom we will now lower the symbols of their eternal glory and their heroi

H0689 - 0044

Rejected

Raeder No. 48

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Attorney Dr. Siemers

I herewith certify that the following document:

Extract from:

The Commander in Chief of the French forces in the eastern Mediterranean, General Weygand to the Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin and to the Commander in Chief of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin

from the White Paper of the Foreign Office No. 6, Berlin 1941:

"The secret documents

of the French General Staff"

from page 90, document No. 38 was copied correctly.

Nuernberg 18 March 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689 – 0045

The Commander in Chief of the French Forces in the eastern Mediterranean, General Weygand to the Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin and to the Commander in Chief of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin.

No. 538/35 Command Post 601, 17 April 1940

The preparations for the bombardment of the Caucasian oil fields have progressed so far that the time can be estimated in which this operation can be carried out.

P o l i t i c a l P r e r e q u i s i t e s:

It is not necessary to keep a time limit. The action does not have to be made the object of an agreement with the Turks, the conclusion of which, moreover has proven to be impossible. The French Ambassador in Turkey has informed the government about this question in detail. At present, permission for flying over Turkish territory is out of the question still more the availability of airfields which could be used as jumping off points. Nor can other help be expected. The transport of materials for the total requirements is being routed via the railroad Aleppo - Nissibine. An advance demarche for the use of this line as far as it touches Turkish territory is not required since our earlier arrangements give us freedom of action in this respect.

. . . . . .

Facsimile page 284

H0689 - 0046

Rejected

Raeder No. 50

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Attorney Dr. Siemers:

I herewith certify that the following document:

The French naval attache at Athens to the Commander in Chief of the French naval forces

from the

White Papers of the Foreign Office No. 7, Berlin 1941
Documents relating to the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

from pages 154,155, document No. 112 was copied correctly.

Nuernberg 5 April 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689 - 0047

The French Naval Attache at Athens to the Commander in Chief of the French Forces.

Report

No. 22 Athens 5 October 1939

Secret and personal

Re: Opinion of the Greek government regarding the possible landing of Allied troops at Salonika.

In my letter No. 11 of 22 September I pointed out that in spite of the benevolence of the Greek government shown to us, the present state of the diplomatic and military situation does not permit to count upon their consent to making open preparations for an expedition to Salonika. This opinion is confirmed by the completely accidental conversation which the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office Mr. Mavroudis had with our Ambassador in Athens regarding this question.

During the course of this conversation, which was neither systematic nor official, Mr. Mavroudis declared to Mr. Maugras that if at the proper time we intend to land an army at Salonika, Greece would not only offer no resistance, but would join her forces with ours, "provided that the diplomatic and military preparations are such that the success of the operation is secured."

Filed May 17, 1946

Raeder No. 53

Nuernberg, 18 April 1946

C e r t i f i c a t e .

I, Hans H e c k e l , Commander (Fregattenkapitaen), Assistant Defense Counsel, hereby certify that the attached document, constisting of

.....1..... typewritten pages

..... photostated

entitled:

. . . . . .

. . K T B . . S.k.l. . Part A. . . December 1939. . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

is a true copy of War-Diary of the Naval War Command (Seekriegsleitung) Part A 1939

which the British Admiralty made available to me as a captured original document.

. . . . . .

H0689 - 0048

H0689 – 0049

19 Dec. Greece let about 20 vessels for the traffic from USA to Le Havre and Liverpool.

30. Dec. Due to the sales and letting of numerous Greek vessels to England, it is ordered with the consent of the Fuehrer that Greek vessels in the sea-area of 20 degrees West to 2 degrees East and 44 degrees North to 62 degrees North are to be treated by submarines as enemies. Attacks if ever possible unobserved.

Filed May 17, 1946

Raeder No 54

Defense Exhibit No.....

Certificate of Attorney at Law Dr. Siemers:

I herewith certify that the following document,

The German Embassy in Hague to the Foreign Office

was correctly copied from page 184/185, document No 130

from

White-Book of the Foreign Office No 7, Berlin 194 Documents to the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece .

Nuernberg, 6 April 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689 - 0050

H0689-0051

The German Embassy in Hague to the Foreign Office

Report

Den Haguc, 23 January 1940

Contents: Great Britain:
Imminent letting of 50 - 60 Greek vessels
to the British Government.

After the English press brought reports at the end of November of last year about the alleged lettings of Greek vessels to British shipping, but without giving information about the extent of them, the " Financial News " reports in its issue of 23rd of this month that negotiations between Greek ship-owners and the British Government concerning the cession of 50 - 60 Greek vessels under time charter are almost concluded. The charter-rates are to be between 17/- and 21/- sh per month and ton. Furthermore, the ship-owners are to demand that the British Government is carrying the premium-expenses for the insurance against war-damage.

The mentioned charter-rates are about four- to six times as high as the pre-war-rates. Due to estimations, made lately in different connection by interested English shipping circles, the here mentioned rates may bring a yearly interest of the capital invested in the vessles, no less than 40 - 60%.

Whether the Greek Navy Minister Tsiffos, who went to

H0689-0052

London at the beginning of the month, is still there and possibly participated in the negotiations, is not known, but it could be guessed out of the coincidence. The Greek Finance Minister Apostolides also has gone to London in the middle of the month with an economic delegation for the purpose of trade-negotiations.

By order

von Selzam.

H0689-0053

Rejected

Raeder No. 55

Defense Exhibit No .....

Statement of Dr. Siemers, Attorney at law :

I certify herewith that the following statement :

The French military attache in Athens to the French Ministery of War

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 7, Berlin 194

Documents about the Conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

from page 172, Document No. 123 is copied correctly

Nuernberg, 6th April 1946

(Dr. W.Siemers).

H0689-0054

The French Military Attache in Athens to the French Ministry of War.

Telegram

No. 232 Athens, 4th Dec.1939

S e c r e t

The head of the Greek General Staff has expressed the desire to the British Military attache and to myself, to enter into conversations about the military questions resulting from the guarantees given to Greece.

In the first place he would like to examine the assistance to be expected by the air Forces and the question of air defense for the landing air-port..... (name left out); but to maintain complete secrecy he refuses to send a mission or an official delegate to Athens.

The French Ambassador in Athens had a conversation with the Under-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the same subject.

Facsimile page 173

H0689-0055

Rejected

Raeder No. 56

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Statement of Attorney at law, Dr. Siemers :

I herewith certify that the following document :

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army General Gamelin to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval Forces

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No.7, Berlin 1941 :

Documents concerning the Conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

from page 174 Document No. 125 is correctly copied.

Nuernberg, 6th April 1946.

(Dr. W. Siemers).

H0689-0056

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army General Gamelin to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval Forces.

S e c r e t

No. 163 Cab/DN

15th Dec. 1939

I take the honour of letting you know that I have confided a mission to Colonel Mariot and
Bataillon Commander Ganneval .
The first is going to Greece, the latter to Sweden and Finnland.
The mission of these officers consists in examining, on the spot, the general conditions under which a possible military collaboration with these countries should be envisaged.

I have appointed these two officers to leave on 20th Dec.

In case you have special questions that you wish to ask either one or both of these officers or in case you wish to influence the research of these two officers in a certain direction, I beg you to inform me immediately, if necessary by sending a liaison-officer.

signed : Gamelin

Facsimile page 174/175.

H0689-0057

Rejected

Raeder No.57

Defense Exhibit No.

Statement of Dr. SIEMERS, Attorney at law:

I herewith certify that the following document:

Questionnaire established by the French general staff

from the

white book of the foreign office No. 7 Berlin 1946.
Documents about the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

from page 175/176, document No.126 is correctly copied.

Nuremberg 6th April 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0689-0058

Questionnaire worked out by the French general staff.

General Headquarters 15 December 1939

General staff

Deputy chief of staff,
Delegate for inter-allied relations
and foreign theaters of war

No. 368 AMG/Toe

Questionnaire

S e c r e t
Confided to Lieutenant Colonel Mariot on 17th Dec.1939 for delivery to .....

Compiled in concord with the admiralty, the air force and General Weygand. To be sent to our military and air attache following the telegram (copy inclosed.) x)

1. Lines of resistance of the Greek army at the frontiers with the front towards Albania, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria; value, kind and depth of these positions are to be indicated as exactly as possible.
2. Lines of resistance built or planned between the Greek frontier and Salonika.
3. Obstacles and destructions.
4. Present possibilities of landing in Salonika, Kawalla, Dedeagatsch and other ports. Existing installations (for mooring, loading, unloading by means of barges, lifting of freight, towing etc.) Increase of existing possibilities (setting up necessary installations, reinforcing of existing means, delays etc.

x) the telegram was not found.

H0689-0059

Ratio of means of increase which could be taken out of Greek ports that are not used (tugs, coastal vessels, personnel etc.)

5. Possibilities of accomodation in Salonika and surroundings of Salonika.

6. Possibilities of storing the provisions necessary for the expeditionary corps in Salonika (provisions, ammunition, gasoline, materials), local resources, stores of A and B gasoline and stores of bombs.

7. Possibilities of installing repair shops, workshops etc.

8. Condition of roads - and railway-connections as well as telegraph and telephone connections between :

Albania and Salonika

Jugoslavia and Salonika

Turkish-Thrace and Salonika

Improvements to be made

Rolling stock in usuable condition, possible increase of it.

9. Airfields, air-ports, already equipped. Air-ports that can be equipped. The means to be envisaged. Present state of repairs to the air-field.west of Salonika.

10. Air-protection measures for landing in the harbour of Salonika. Possible protection by Greek fighter-planes. Air-protection measures for the present installations. Number of existing batteries and number of batteries necessary. The same questions for the other ports of the Aegaean Sea.

H0689-0060

11. Naval bases that can possibly be used (Salamis, Moudros etc.) Present state of equipment. Equipment necessary. Technical possibilities of the Arsenal in Salamis.

12. How is the Greek merchant fleet in the East-Mediterranean constituted ? Which units (passenger-or freight-steamers) could be put at the disposal of the expeditionary corps ? Till when could they be assembled at Beirut or Smyrna ?
Exact indications about their loading capacity (crew, draught, material).

13. Exchange of news about enemy or hostile countries .

Facsimile page 177/178

H0689-0061

Rejected

Raeder No. 58
Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement of Dr. Siemers Attorney at law .

I certify herewith, that the following document:
Note of the Commander in chief of the French Army General Gamelin
about a possible interallied intervention in the Balkans
from the

White book of the Foreign Office No. 7

Berlin 1941: Documents concerning the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

from page 183 Document No. 128, is correcty copied.

Nuernberg 6 April 1946

(r. W. Siemers)

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H0689-0062

Note of Commander in chief of the French Army General Gamelin about a. possible interallied intervention in the Balkans.

(Extract)

189/Cab/D.N.

General Headquarters 4 January 19

..... The Chief of the Great Generalstaff of the Greek Army gave to understand that he could safeguard the landing of an interallied Expeditionary corps in Salonika provided he received sufficient support through airforces and A.A. forces.

..... The French High Command will, observing the topmost discretion remain in contact, with the Jugoslav, Rumanian and Greek High command without binding in any way the chiefs of the British Generalstaff.....

signed Gamelin

Facsimile page 183

- 272 -

H0689-0063

Filed May 17

Raeder No. 59

Defense Exhibit No. ...

Statement by Dr.Siemers, Attorney:

I certify herewith that the following document:

extracts from: Minutes of the meeting of the French War Committee on 26th April 1940

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No.6 Berlin 1941:

"The Secret Files of the French General Staff"

have been copied correctly from pages 95 - 98, documentNo.41

Nuernberg, 18th March 1946.

(Dr.W.Siemers)

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H0689-0064

Minutes of the meeting of the French War Committee on

26th April 1940

Meeting of the War Committee on 26th April 1940

in the Palais de l'Elysee at 15 o'clock

Present:

The President of the Republic

The Premier and Foreign Minister

The Minister for Defence and for War

The Navy Minister

The Minister for Air

The Minister for Colonies

The Commander in Chief and Chief of the General Staff for National Defense

The Admiral of the Fleet and C.inC French Navy

The Commander in Chief of the Air Force

The Chief of the General Staff for colonies

The Commander in Chief in the North Eastern theater of operations

The Secretary General of the Supreme Council for National Defense.

Top Secret

Meeting of the War Committee on 26th April 1940

The Premier announces the purpose of the meeting:

Examination of the situation in Norway.

The German have succeeded in capturing important strong poi

H0689-0065

It is difficult for the Allies to make a landing. The Norwegians have been hard hit.

The prestige of the Allies is endangered.

The British have been in the picture for quite some time, as the operation was decided upon on 28 March.

The Minister for Defense and for War declares that they were not at all enthusiastic about it.

The Premier adds that a large scale operation should have been undertaken at Drontheim. He asks General Gamelin for his view of the situation.

General Gamelin discloses that the Germans have established contact between their forces at Oslo and those at Drontheim.

General Lelong has informed him that the British had the intention of reembarking those of their troops intended f the attack on Drontheim.

.....

In the vicinity of Narvik, the situation is unchanged. Reports are scarce and uncertain.

It must be said that the enemy forces had been transporte on merchant ships and camouflaged. They eluded the Intell gence Service.

General Gamelin has never failed to insist on the continu tion and intensification of the operations. On the mornin of 29 March, he had called General Ironside's attention to the necessity of having everything ready for a speedy occupation of the NorwegianHarbours. He said the same thi to Mr.Winston Churchill when he was staying in Paris.

H0689-0066

The Prime Minister asks a question on how the command is organised.

General Gamelin replies that the British General Makesy is in command in Narvik and the British General Carton de Wiart in command in Namsos. General Morgan, who command the British Brigade which disembarked South of Drontheim, is in command in this area, in place of theFrench General Audet who, according to the original intention of General Gamelin, should have taken over the command in this district but had, however, landed in Namsos. The whole is commanded by Gen al Massy.

. . . . . .

The War Committee finally examines the question of possib operations in the area of the Caucasus and in the Balkans With regard to the latter theater of operations, the Premi states that General Jauneaud, in agreement with General Wygand, has gone into the question of establishing air bases in Rumania and Greece. The preparatory investigatio has shown an estimated cost of 10 millions for Rumania an 15 millions for Greece. General Jauneaud will continue his investigation and preparations on the spot.

The President of the Republic pointed out that this trip may attract attention and that it might perhaps

H0689-0067

be more opportune if these two countries were visited by an officer of General Jauneand's staff. Laurent Eynac states that the work will be carried out either by the Air Attache or by an officer of the General's staff, in civilian clothes.

Facsimile page 294

H0689-0068

Rejected

Raeder No. 60
Defense Exhibit No.

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney:

I certify herewith that the following document:

The French Minister for National Defense and War Daladier to the Commander in Chief of the French Army General Gamelin

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 6 Berlin 1941:

"The Secret Files of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 118, document No.48.

Nuremberg 18th March 1946

(Dr.W. Siemers)

H0689-0069

The French Minister for National Defense and War Daladier to the Commander in Chief of the French Army General Gamelin.

S e c r e t Paris, 1 May 1940

No. 995 DN.

Re:

Operations in the Mediterranean.

Pursuant to the letter of the Admiralty No.948 F F 3 of 17 April,x) of which you have received copy, I wish to inform you that I completely share Admiral Darlan's opinion of the special importance of the landing operations which he contemplates on Greek territory.

The anti aircraft defense of our navy bases in case of operations in the eastern Mediterranean must also be prepared.

Will you therefore kindly:

a) give the commanders in chief in the theaters of operation in North Africa and in the Middle East the necessary instructions for the assembling of troops which are necessary for the planned occupations;

b) inform the Admiralty immediately which changes, if any, would result for the drawing up of plans for transportation;

c) issue orders that, if occasion arises, the 9 cm anti aircraft batteries in the area around Paris will be

x) not on hand

H0689-0070

reassigned to the Navy and be promptly replaced by modern 7,5 cm anti aircraft batteries.

Daladier

Facsimile page 338

H0689-0071

Rejected

Raeder No. 62
Defense Exhibit No....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney-at-Law

I herewith certify that the following document:

The French Admiralty to the French Foreign Office from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 7, Berlin 1941:

Documents on the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

is copied correctly from page 191 Document No. 134.

Nuernberg, 6 April, 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689-0072

The French Admiralty to the French Foreign Office

Telegram

No. 4213

Paris 19 May 1940

.....This material which must not be accompanied by personnel would be sold to Greek Government for form's sake. After being landed in the Piraeus it would be distributed in Greece according to instructions of General Staff French Army.

On the envelope of telegram is the following handwritten notation:

The Greek Government is prepared to accept, already now material intended for possible allied landing troops.

Facsimile page 191

H0689-0073

Filed May 17

Raeder No. 63

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney-at-Law

I herewith certify that the following document:

Address of the British Secretary of State for India, Amery in Newmarket on 1 Dec 1940

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 7, Berlin 1941

Document on the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece is copied correctly from page 194 Document No. 138.

Nuernberg 6 April 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689-0074

Address of the British Secretary of State for India, Amery in Newmarket on 1 Dec 1940

(Extract)

..... If we can enable Greece to hold out until we have finished the Italians in Egypt we shall have secured a position for our army from which we can threaten the flanks of every German attack on Turkey. From this position we could finally, with our own armies and the new allies which will rally to us because of our growing strength deal the knockout blow to the German dragon, not against the scale-armour of the Siegfried Line, but against its soft underbelly..... .....

H0689-0075

Rejected

Raeder No. 64

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney at Law

I herewith certify that the following document:

Address by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill before the House of Commons on 19 Dec 1940

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office No. 7, Berlin 1941

Documents on the conflict with Jugoslavia and Greece

is copied correctly from page 194 Document No. 139

Nuernberg 6 April 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0689-0076

Address by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill before the House of Commons on 19 Dec 1940

(Extract)

.....I must not forget the deeds which were accomplished in this battle by Air Marshall Longmore.

In the most critical moment of his preparations a large part of his forces had to be withdrawn from him to be sent to Greece. In spite of this he continued his efforts, accepting additional risks. The way in which he mastered this situation in cooperation with the Army deserves the highest praise.....